On the Analytic and the Synthetic

Abstract

In a pair of articles,¹ Professors White and Quine have enumerated eight definitions of the term ‘analytic’ and after giving consideration to each, they assert that all these definitions are inadequate. Professor Quine even considers the sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic statements an unfounded dogma. But after these articles, there appeared successively three articles² by other authors, all of which showed different opinions and tried to do justice to the term ‘analytic’. Two of them were written by R. M. Martin and John G. Kemeny. Both authors restricted their attention to the definition: “A sentence is analytic if and only if it can be reduced to a logical truth by definition.” Both argued persuasively in its support, and I concur in their opinion.

Reprinted from The Philosophical Review 65 (1956) 218–228 by permission of the publisher and the author.