Skip to main content

Wage bargaining and employment

  • Chapter
Economic Models of Trade Unions

Part of the book series: International Studies in Economic Modelling ((ISIM))

Abstract

One of the perennial problems of business cyde theory has been the search for a convincing empirical description and theoretical explanation of the behaviour of wage rates during fluctuations in output and employment. Even the empirical question is hardly settled, although the most recent careful study (Geary and Kennan) confirms the prevailing view that real-wage movements are more or less independent of the business cycle. There are really two subquestions here. The first presumes that nominal wage stickiness is the main route by which nominal disturbances have real macroeconomic effects, and asks why nominal wages should be sticky. The second focuses on real wages, and asks why fluctuations in the demand for labour should so often lead to large changes in employment and small, unsystematic, changes in the real wage.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Azariadis, C. (1979) Implicit contracts and related topics: A Survey, unpublished working paper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cartter, A. M. (1959) Theory of Wages and Employment, Homewood, Irwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Menil, G. (1971) Bargaining: Monopoly Power versus Union Power, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Geary, P. T. and Kennan, J. The employment-real wage relationship: An international study Journal of Political Economy, 90(4), 854–71.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, R. E. and Lilien, D. M. (1979) Efficient wage bargains under uncertain supply and demand. American Economic Review, 69, 868–79.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalai, E. and Smorodinsky, M. (1975) Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem. Econometrica, 43, 513–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leontief, W. (1946) The pure theory of the guaranteed annual wage contract. Journal of Political Economy, 54, 76–79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raiffa, H. (1953) Arbitration schemes for generalized two-person games, in Contributions To The Theory of Games II, (eds H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 361–87.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Mcdonald, I.M., Solow, R.M. (1992). Wage bargaining and employment. In: Garonna, P., Mori, P., Tedeschi, P. (eds) Economic Models of Trade Unions. International Studies in Economic Modelling. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2378-5_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2378-5_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5049-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-2378-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics