Abstract
Labour economists have long been interested in modelling the collective bargaining process, but the development of such models has proceeded slowly. Two major stumbling blocks have impeded progress. The first is the problem of specifying the objectives of a labour union. The second problem is modelling how collective bargaining resolves conflicts between the objectives of the union and the employer. These problems are intimately related because the formulation chosen for union preferences plays a critical role in determining how bargaining can be modelled. In this paper we report progress on both froms. We construct a model of collective bargaining that is not only empirically tractable but also rigorously and explicitly grounded in maximizing behaviour by union members.
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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Blair, D.H., Crawford, D.L. (1992). Labour union objectives and collective bargaining. In: Garonna, P., Mori, P., Tedeschi, P. (eds) Economic Models of Trade Unions. International Studies in Economic Modelling. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2378-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2378-5_2
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