Abstract
Their platforms reflect concern with enhancing the probability of being elected, but some candidates often, or all candidates occasionally, voluntarily adopt stances that reduce that probability. Governments care about their popularity, but sometimes they choose, even before an election, to announce or implement policies that are unpopular. For most people, the phenomenon is no news and is not altogether a unhappy one. Deprecating words such as demagogy or “mob rule” and praising ones such as leadership or statesmanship express a deeply-rooted, widely-shared concern about the possibility that democratic politicians could be too subservient to public opinion.
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Salmon, P. (1993). Unpopular Policies and the Theory of Representative Democracy. In: Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., Wintrobe, R. (eds) Preferences and Democracy. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2188-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2188-0_2
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