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Voting Rights and the Demand for Public Expenditure. An Analysis of the redistributive impact of universal suffrage

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Part of the International Studies in Economics and Econometrics book series (ISEE, volume 28)

Abstract

The extension of the franchise has been considered, since de Tocqueville, as an important determinant of the demand for public services and, consequently, of the size of government.

Keywords

Public Choice Median Voter Winning Coalition Reserve Wage Decisive Voter 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1993

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