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Government Risk-Bearing pp 109–130Cite as

Perspectives on the Role of Government Risk-Bearing within the Financial Sector

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Abstract

In virtually all industrialized economies, governments assume a major role in risk-bearing. They provide a variety of forms of “social” insurance (retirement annuities and disability, unemployment, and medical insurance), issue credit and credit guarantees, and offer or organize insurance for those engaging in transactions with financial institutions (deposit insurance, pension funds, and guaranty funds for beneficiaries of insurance policies). The magnitude of these risk-bearing activities is enormous: In recent years, government loans and guaranteed loans (for which government bears the risk of default) have account for as much as one-third of all private lending in the United States.

This paper is based on research supported by the National Science Foundation and the Hoover Institution. Much of the article represents joint work with Richard Arnott, Bruce Greenwald, and Andrew Weiss, to whom the author is greatly indebted.

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Authors
  1. Joseph E. Stiglitz
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Mark S. Sniderman

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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Stiglitz, J.E. (1993). Perspectives on the Role of Government Risk-Bearing within the Financial Sector. In: Sniderman, M.S. (eds) Government Risk-Bearing. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2184-2_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2184-2_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4967-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-2184-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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