Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Advances in Computational Economics ((AICE,volume 1))

  • 207 Accesses

Abstract

The problem of users of a congested transportation network seeking to determine their travel paths of minimal cost from origins to their respective destinations is a classical network equilibrium problem. It appears as early as 1920 in the work of Pigou, who considered a two-node, two-link (or path) transportation network, and was further developed by Knight (1924). In this problem setting, the demand side corresponds to potential travelers, or consumers, of the network, whereas the supply side is represented by the network itself, with prices corresponding to travel costs. The equilibrium occurs when the number of trips between an origin and a destination equals the travel demand given by the market price, that is, the travel time for the trips.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Aashtiani, H. Z., and Magnanti, T. L., “Equilibria on a congested transportation network,” SIAM Journal on Algebraic and Discrete Methods 2 (1981) 213–226.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aashtiani, H. Z., and Magnanti, T. L., “A linearization and decomposition algorithm for computing urban traffic equilibria,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Large Scale Systems Symposium, pp. 8–19, 1982.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beckmann, M., McGuire, C. B., and Winsten, C. B., Studies in the Economics of Transportation, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1956.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bertsekas, D. P., and Gafni, E. M., “Projection methods for variational inequalities with application to the traffic assignment problem,” Mathematical Programming 17 (1982) 139–159.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bertsekas, D. P., and Gallager, R., Data Networks, second edition, Prentice - Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1992.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyce, D. E., “Urban transportation network-equilibrium and design models: recent achievements and future prospects,” Environment and Planning 16A (1984) 1445–1474.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Braess, D., “Uber ein paradoxon der verkehrsplanung,” Unternehmenforschung 12 (1968) 258–268.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dafermos, S. C., “Toll patterns for multiclass-user transportation networks,” Transportation Science 7 (1973) 211–223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dafermos, S., “Integrated equilibrium flow models for transportation planning,” in Traffic Equilibrium Methods, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 118, pp. 106–118, M. A. Florian, editor, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1976.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Dafermos, S., “Traffic equilibrium and variational inequalities,” Transportation Science 14 (1980) 42–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dafermos, S., “The general multimodal network equilibrium problem with elastic demand,” Networks 12 (1982a) 57–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dafermos, S., “Relaxation algorithms for the general asymmetric traffic equilibrium problem,” Transportation Science 16 (1982b) 231–240.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dafermos, S., “Equilibria on nonlinear networks,” LCDS # 86–1, Lefschetz Center for Dynamical Systems, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, 1986.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dafermos, S., and Nagurney, A., “On some traffic equilibrium theory paradoxes,” Transportation Research 18B (1984a) 101–110.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dafermos, S., and Nagurney, A., “Stability and sensitivity analysis for the general network equilibrium-travel choice model,” in Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory, pp. 217–234, J. Volmuller and R. Hamerslag, editors, VNU Science Press, Utrecht, The Netherlands, 1984b.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dafermos, S., and Nagurney, A., “Sensitivity analysis for the asymmetric network equilibrium problem,” Mathematical Programming 28 (1984c) 174–184.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dafermos, S. C., and Sparrow, F. T., “The traffic assignment problem for a general network,” Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards 73B (1969) 91–118.

    Google Scholar 

  • Florian, M. (1977), “A traffic equilibrium model of travel by car and public transit modes,” Transportation Science 8 (1977) 166–179.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Florian, M., and Spiess, H., “The convergence of diagonalization algorithms for asymmetric network equilibrium problems,” Transportation Research 16B (1982) 477–483.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frank, M., “Obtaining network cost(s) from one link’s output,” Transportation Science 26 (1992) 27–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friesz, T. L., “Transportation network equilibrium, design and aggregation: key developments and research opportunities,” Transportation Research 19A (1985) 413–427.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knight, F. H., “Some fallacies in the interpretations of social costs,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 38 (1924) 582–606.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Magnanti, T. L., “Models and algorithms for predicting urban traffic equilibria,” in Transportation Planning Models, pp. 153–185, M. Florian, editor, North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1984.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mahmassani, H. S., and Mouskos, K. C., “Some numerical results on the diagonalization algorithm for network assignment with asymmetric interactions between cars and trucks,” Transportation Research 22B (1988) 275–290.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murchland, J. D., “Braess’s paradox of traffic flow,” Transportation Research 4 (1970) 391–394.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nagurney, A., “Comparative tests of multimodal traffic equilibrium methods,” Transportation Research 18B (1984) 469–485.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagurney, A., “Computational comparisons of algorithms for general asymmetric traffic equilibrium problems with fixed and elastic demands,” Transportation Research 20B (1986) 78–84.

    Google Scholar 

  • Patriksson, M., “Algorithms for urban traffic network equilibria,” Linkoping Studies in Science and Technology, Department of Mathematics, Thesis, no. 263, Linkoping University, Linkoping, Sweden, 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pigou, A. C., The Economics of Welfare, MacMillan, London, England, 1920.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson, P. A., “Spatial price equilibrium and linear programming,” American Economic Review 42 (1952) 283–303.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheffi, Y., Urban Transportation Networks - Equilibrium Analysis with Mathematical Programming Methods, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1985.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, M. J., “Existence, uniqueness, and stability of traffic equilibria,” Transportation Research 13B (1979) 259–304.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wardrop, J. G., “Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research,” in Proceedings of the Institute of Civil Engineers,Part II, pp. 325–378, 1952.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Nagurney, A. (1993). Traffic Network Equilibrium. In: Network Economics: A Variational Inequality Approach. Advances in Computational Economics, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2178-1_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2178-1_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4964-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-2178-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics