Abstract
Jan Srzednicki is not the only one to have found Kant’s discussion of freedom unconvincing but his diagnosis of the problem suggests a construal that makes Kant’s position defensible. Srzednicki writes:
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The puzzle of freewill arises squarely on the level of appearances and needs to be solved there; to say that there is a possibility of freedom on another level does not face the question at all.1
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The thing which is of importance here is the fact that the empirical and transcendental level each generate questions of their own and the questions are naturally of a different order. It is not at all obvious that a question generated on one level can be solved on the other.2
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Notes
The Place of Space and Other Themes, Nijhoff, 1983, p. 9.
Op. cit., p. 8.
The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. T.K. Abbott, 6th ed., Longmans, London and New York, 1909, pp. 189–90.
An Essay on Free Will, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 56.
The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan, London, 1963, A554, B582.
Op. cit., A549, B577.
See Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980.
The term is H.A. Simon’s. See, for example, his Reason in Human Affairs, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.
‘Determinism’, Mind, 1957, pp. 28–41.
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Duckworth, London, 1988, p. 9.
Change in View, MIT, 1986, p. 3.
See The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press, 1958.
Loc. cit.
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Blackwell, Oxford, 1956, 1–141.
On Certainty, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, Section 501.
Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action, RKP, London & New York, pp. 169–70.
‘A Noncausal Theory of Agency’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, December, 1988.
See the Chapter on ‘The Will’ in his Principles of Psychology.
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Marshall, G. (1993). Kant’s Complaint of a Wretched Subterfuge. In: Poli, R. (eds) Consciousness, Knowledge, and Truth. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2060-9_11
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