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Kant’s Complaint of a Wretched Subterfuge

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Consciousness, Knowledge, and Truth
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Abstract

Jan Srzednicki is not the only one to have found Kant’s discussion of freedom unconvincing but his diagnosis of the problem suggests a construal that makes Kant’s position defensible. Srzednicki writes:

  • The puzzle of freewill arises squarely on the level of appearances and needs to be solved there; to say that there is a possibility of freedom on another level does not face the question at all.1

  • The thing which is of importance here is the fact that the empirical and transcendental level each generate questions of their own and the questions are naturally of a different order. It is not at all obvious that a question generated on one level can be solved on the other.2

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Notes

  1. The Place of Space and Other Themes, Nijhoff, 1983, p. 9.

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  2. Op. cit., p. 8.

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  3. The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. T.K. Abbott, 6th ed., Longmans, London and New York, 1909, pp. 189–90.

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  4. An Essay on Free Will, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 56.

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  5. The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan, London, 1963, A554, B582.

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  6. Op. cit., A549, B577.

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  7. See Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980.

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  8. The term is H.A. Simon’s. See, for example, his Reason in Human Affairs, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.

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  9. ‘Determinism’, Mind, 1957, pp. 28–41.

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  10. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Duckworth, London, 1988, p. 9.

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  11. Change in View, MIT, 1986, p. 3.

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  12. See The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press, 1958.

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  13. Loc. cit.

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  14. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Blackwell, Oxford, 1956, 1–141.

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  15. On Certainty, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, Section 501.

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  16. Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action, RKP, London & New York, pp. 169–70.

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  17. ‘A Noncausal Theory of Agency’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, December, 1988.

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  18. See the Chapter on ‘The Will’ in his Principles of Psychology.

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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Marshall, G. (1993). Kant’s Complaint of a Wretched Subterfuge. In: Poli, R. (eds) Consciousness, Knowledge, and Truth. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2060-9_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2060-9_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

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