Abstract
In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Franz Brentano sets forth a theory of consciousness which implies (i) that every mental state includes an awareness of the subject of that state. (ii) that every mental state is itself an object of consciousness and (iii) that there are no unconscious mental states. Brentano’s views on these matters, it seems to me, are of first importance. Many of Brentano’s critics have felt that they involve insuperable difficulties. In the present essay, I will attempt to put these views as clearly as possible and to suggest how Brentano might deal with some of the criticisms that have been made.
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Notes
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (London: Routhledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 128. The German reads: “Dem Tone erscheint das Hören im eigentlichsten Sinne zugewandt, und indem es dieses ist, scheint es sich selbst nebenbei und als Zugabe mit zu erfassen”; Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Band I (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1973), p. 180. The German edition is divided into two volumes.
Psychology, p. 132.
Metaphysics, 1074b, 35–36 (quoted in the Psychology, p. 132), Compare De Anima, III, 2: “It is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing or hearing.”
Psychology, p. 128; Psychologie, Band I, p. 180. Psychologie, Band I, p. 179–180. It should be noted that Brentano’s use of “physical” is somewhat special. He calls the object of sensation “physical” in order to contrast it with the act of sensation which is intentional and therefore mental. Another succinct statement may be found in Brentano’s Religion und Philosophie (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Velag, 1954), p. 226, but evidently it was written by Alfred Kastil, the editor of the volume, and not by Brentano (see p. 265).
Psychology, p. 130.
Psychology, p. 138.
Op. cit., p. 139.
The True and the Evident (London: Routhledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 127.
See Psychology, p. 128.
See the detailed discussion of this point in Anhang I of Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1993).
Edmund Husserl acribes to Brentano the view that consciousness is “a continuous stream of internal perception”; see his Logical Investigations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), Vol. II, p. 838. But, strictly speaking, we can attribute this view to Brentano only if we take “perception” in an extended sense – comparable to our extended sense of “evident”
Psychology, p. 137; Psychologie, Band I, p. 194.
Psychology, p. 102.
Psychology, pp. 105ff.
Psychology, p. 137.
Oskar Kraus, review of Leonard Nelson’s Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in Die Naturwissenschaften, Band VII (1918), 79–82; the quotation is on p. 82.
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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Chisholm, R.M. (1993). Brentano on “Unconscious Consciousness”. In: Poli, R. (eds) Consciousness, Knowledge, and Truth. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2060-9_10
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