Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 149))

  • 110 Accesses

Abstract

Many people think that counterfactuals offer a key to understanding causation. For a causal claim seems to many to involve, in part, a claim about the way things would have been without the “cause”. What is nice about counterfactuals is that they seem to provide a way to capture what is so tempting about using Mill’s methods (and Hume’s General Rules) as an analysis (instead of a test) of causation. The idea is this: hold everything the same, take out the “cause” event, and “see” if the “effect” event occurs.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Bunzl, M. (1993). Causal Factuals. In: The Context of Explanation. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 149. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1735-7_9

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1735-7_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4760-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-1735-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics