Abstract
Many people think that counterfactuals offer a key to understanding causation. For a causal claim seems to many to involve, in part, a claim about the way things would have been without the “cause”. What is nice about counterfactuals is that they seem to provide a way to capture what is so tempting about using Mill’s methods (and Hume’s General Rules) as an analysis (instead of a test) of causation. The idea is this: hold everything the same, take out the “cause” event, and “see” if the “effect” event occurs.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bunzl, M. (1993). Causal Factuals. In: The Context of Explanation. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 149. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1735-7_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1735-7_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4760-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-1735-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive