Abstract
Most philosophers think of laws as universal in syntactic form.1 But there is a stronger sense in which laws are thought of as universal. They are the kind of things that we think of as holding true everywhere if anywhere. Attempts have been made to make this idea precise in a number of different ways. Some speak of laws as making no reference to specific locations in space and time. Others take laws to contain no explicit space or time coordinates. Still others think of laws as invariant under space-time translations. Yet others speak of laws as unrestricted in range in space and time. It turns out that none of these attempts is very satisfactory in capturing the sought-after universality of laws.2 Nonetheless, it is still commonly held that laws are (in some sense) “unrestricted” above and beyond the trivial sense in which any universal generalization is unrestricted.3
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bunzl, M. (1993). Laws. In: The Context of Explanation. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 149. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1735-7_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1735-7_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4760-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-1735-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive