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Demand in a Duopoly with Horizontal Product Differentiation

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Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLC,volume 11))

Abstract

In the location models studied in the literature, consumers buy one unit of two, or more, horizontally differentiated products. As such, those models are for durable goods. For ordinary consumption goods like oranges, a model is developed, in which consumers may buy more than one unit, possibly different units, of a horizontally differentiated product. Demand and different rationing rules are derived for such a model, based on reservation prices that depend on quantities bought and the quality of both goods.

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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Furth, D. (1994). Demand in a Duopoly with Horizontal Product Differentiation. In: Gilles, R.P., Ruys, P.H.M. (eds) Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations. Theory and Decision Library, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1370-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1370-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4599-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-1370-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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