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Formation of International Environmental Agreements

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Trade, Innovation, Environment

Abstract

We study the formation of emission abatement coalitions. A necessary condition for a coalition to be viable is that all of its members are net gainers. For this to happen, a coalition has to be at least of a certain size, the minimum critical size. We show that if there are fixed costs associated with abatement programs, or if there are “reinforcement effects”, then under certain conditions coalitions in excess of the minimum critical size are not vulnerable to “free riding” or to prisoners’ dilemma problems.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Business, Uris Hall, Columbia University, New York, USA

    Geoffrey Heal

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  1. Geoffrey Heal
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Venice, Greta, Italy

    Carlo Carraro

  2. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, Italy

    Carlo Carraro

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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Heal, G. (1994). Formation of International Environmental Agreements. In: Carraro, C. (eds) Trade, Innovation, Environment. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Series on Economics, Energy and Environment, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0948-2_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0948-2_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4409-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-0948-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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