Abstract
In being based on the Deductive Model, the Popperian and Empiricist views of science take scientific laws and theories to be statements of the form: for all x, if x has the property F, then x has the property G. The first step is conceptually to delineate a universe of x’s having property F, and then it is to be empirically determined whether such x’s also have property G. A number of these x’s are thus to be observed and found either to have or not to have this property. There is no middle way—on this view either the predicate G is applicable or it is not, and if not, the law or theory is considered false
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Notes
This difference thus serves also to distinguish the present view from the set-theoretic conception—cf. Chapter 11 below
Cf. Kuhn (1962), p. 147: “ AU historically significant theories have agreed with the facts, but only more or less. There is no more precise answer to the question whether or how well an individual theory fits the facts. But questions much like that can be asked when theories are taken collectively or even in pairs. It makes a great deal of sense to ask which of two actual and competing theories fits the facts better.”
The present conception as a matter of fact originated independently of the Gestalt Model, and was introduced in an earlier study via an example in which the different systems of co-ordinates formulante within the special theory of relativity were each taken to constitute a ‘conceptual perspective’. Thus not only might the particular account of science being presented here have taken a different starting point, but the Gestalt Model itself is by no means intended to function as the basis of a philosophy of a more general nature
Cf. Hanson (1958), p. 90: “ Physical theories provide patterns within which data appear intelligible. They constitute a ‘conceptual Gestalt’.”
Cf. Kuhn (1976), pp. 190-191: “ Most readers of my text have supposed that when I spoke of theories as incommensurable, I meant that they could not be compared. But ‘incommensurability’ is a term borrowed from mathematics, and it there has no such implication.” For a recent instance of a misunderstanding of Kuhn in this regard, cf. Laudan (1977), p. 143
For a similar point of view, see Feyerabend (1975), p. 229
Feyerabend (1975), pp. 228-229. For another use of the term “ simultaneity” in the context of the incommensurability question see Stegmüller (1979), p. 69. The concept of simultaneity given above is also potentially applicable to the case of complementarity in quantum physics, as is suggested e.g. by P. Jordan’s saying: “ The properties connected with the wave nature of light on the one hand and those connected with its corpuscular nature on the other … can never appear in one and the same experiment at the same time” (1944), p. 132
Russell (1940), p. 100
O’Connor (1955), p. 112
Kenner (1965), p. 151. Kenner however takes this to imply the triviality of the problem with colour concepts, while it is here seen as suggesting its generality
For a (very) early discussion of this problem which is quite in keeping with the present view, see Campbell (1920), pp. 51ff
Wittgenstein (1921), §5.5423
Cf. Kuhn (1957), pp. 201 ff. For a discussion relevant to the present one, see Hanson (1966)
Kuhn (1961), pp. 176-177
Popper (1975), pp. 82-83
Shapere (1966), p. 57. See also e.g. Achinstein (1964), p. 499, and Giedymin (1970), p. 265. Note also Stegmüller’s remark that, as criticisms of the views of Kuhn and Feyerabend, “ Almost all of Shapere’s arguments are based on the statement view and, for the most part, lose their force with its rejection.” (1973), p. 261
M. Hesse touches on this point and provides an example relevant to it in her (1963), pp. 102-103
Ullman (1962), p. 234
Feyerabend (1978), p. 70
For a discussion of Feyerabend’s ‘pragmatic theory’, with relevant references, see Shapere (1966), pp. 59ff. See also Feyerabend’s discussion of crucial experiments in e.g. his (1970), pp. 226 ff
Hanson et al. (1970). p. 247
In Dilworth (1978) the term “ intention” was used to cover both of the notions ‘intention’ and ‘reference’ treated in the present study
For a similar description of this approach, and a discussion of it, see Wartofsky (1968), pp. 277 ff
Agazzi (1976), p. 148. Note that Agazzi’s ‘viewpoints’ are here more closely aligned with different sciences than with different theories. For a development of this view see the rest of Agazzi (1976), as well as Agazzi (1977a)
Kuhn’s view of incommensurable theories thus differs from the present one to the extent that he suggests that such theories need pertain to different data; in this regard cf. Kuhn (1962), p. 126, and (1974), p. 473 n
Cf. a slightly different example given in Allen & Maxwell (1939), p. 5: “ We can better understand the difficulties of the earlier investigators if we consider the question of measuring colour. Colour we generally regard as a quality. It is, however, possible to select a scale in which a particular colour, blue for example, is graduated in depth from very pale to very dark. We could go further and, by making a mental estimate, attach a series of numbers to the varius samples so that we could speak of any given sample of blue as having so many ‘degrees of blue’. This is not quite the same process as a physical measurement, but we might take a further step and try to find a correlation between our mental scale and a physical scale derived, for example, from the amount of dye used in preparing a specimen or from the relative proportions of the blue and white sectors in a rotating disc.” With regard to the relation between operations and scientific objectivity in the context of colour concepts, see Agazzi (1978), pp. 100 ff
Agazzi (1977b), p. 166. This quotation also has direct relevance to the tables appearing at the beginning of the next chapter
As regards this last point see Kuhn (1957), pp. 172-173. For the other points see the same work, esp. Chs. 2 & 5
Thus the notion of simplicity discussed here is a relative one, and the present explanation should answer Lakatos’ question as regards how Copernicus’ theory is simpler than Ptolemy’s: see Lakatos (1970), p. 117 & n. Feyerabend too raises questions in this regard, but seems to admit the relative simplicity of the Copernican system when he asks: “ Why should astronomers in the 16th century have accepted a physically and theologically impossible theory just because of its simplicity?” See Feyerabend (1978), p. 47
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Dilworth, C. (1994). The Perspectivist Conception of Science. In: Scientific Progress. Synthese Library, vol 153. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0914-7_10
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