Abstract
The debate about whether monetary policy decisions should be governed by rules or discretion has a long history, extending back at least as far as Henry Simons (1936). This debate has continued in the post-war period and still continues today. I will argue in this paper that the elements of a consensus are now beginning to emerge. Neither pure discretion, nor fixed adherence to an intermediate monetary target have proved satisfactory. In their place, several countries are moving toward a regime in which there is a clear target for the ultimate objective of monetary policy, together with a statement of the authorities’ decision making practices that is as open and transparent as possible.
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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Crockett, A.D. (1994). Rules versus Discretion in Monetary Policy. In: De Beaufort Wijnholds, J.O., Eijffinger, S.C.W., Hoogduin, L.H. (eds) A Framework for Monetary Stability. Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, vol 27. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0850-8_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0850-8_16
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