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The Case Against Value-Free Belief

  • Elena Klevakina-Uljanov
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 59)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to consider the interrelation between belief and values. My claims are that (1) belief cannot be value-free, for it stands in extrinsic and intrinsic relations to values, (2) an attempt to reduce values attached to a certain belief to cognitive values would not be of great help for “purifying” the belief.

Keywords

True Belief Forced Option Natural Good Epistemic Authority Justificatory Reason 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elena Klevakina-Uljanov

There are no affiliations available

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