Abstract
I do not speak about Belief but only of beliefs of the common variety. My talk takes me across a very wide and controversial field. It cannot, therefore, be more than a brief statement on the most important points involved.1 My theses will sound rather apodictical, since I leave out most of the arguments. I shall discuss the following questions: Do beliefs have reasons? Do they have causes? Are rational explanations of beliefs compatible with causal ones? I shall close with some remarks on the hypothesis of a causal determination of mental events.
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References
Benacerraf, Paul: 1967, ‘God, the devil, and Gödel’, The Monist 51, 9–32.
Kutschera, Franz v.: 1993, Die falsche Objektivit ät, de Gruyter, Berlin.
Kutschera, Franz v.: 1993a, ‘Causation’, to appear in the Journal of Philosophical Logic.
Kutschera, Franz v.: 1994, ‘Global supervenience and doxastic logic’, to appear in the Journal of Philosophical Logic.
Searle, John R.: 1984, Minds, Brains, and Science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge/Mass.
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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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von Kutschera, F. (1994). Reasons and Causes of Beliefs. In: Weingartner, P. (eds) Scientific and Religious Belief. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 59. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0804-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0804-1_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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