Reasons and Causes of Beliefs
I do not speak about Belief but only of beliefs of the common variety. My talk takes me across a very wide and controversial field. It cannot, therefore, be more than a brief statement on the most important points involved.1 My theses will sound rather apodictical, since I leave out most of the arguments. I shall discuss the following questions: Do beliefs have reasons? Do they have causes? Are rational explanations of beliefs compatible with causal ones? I shall close with some remarks on the hypothesis of a causal determination of mental events.
KeywordsCausal Explanation Causal Chain Epistemic Logic Rational Explanation Chance Event
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