Knowledge, Faith and Skepticism
Skepticism and knowledge stand in opposition as do faith and skepticism, and, consequently, both knowledge and faith as well as the relationship between them can be clarified by consideration of how they provide us with relief from skepticism. My contention is that the propositional attitude appropriate to knowledge is a different attitude than that involved in faith, though both attitudes are commonly referred to as belief. I distinguish between acceptance and belief, admitting that the distinction is to some extent stipulative, and argue that the former is the stuff of which knowledge is made. Faith, by contrast, involves belief and, according to some, the highest degree of belief, namely certainty.
KeywordsBelief System True Belief Propositional Attitude Justify Belief Acceptance System
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