Abstract
Charles Peirce insisted a long time ago that justifying beliefs currently held is unnecessary. Only changes in belief require justification. Epistemologists should turn away from the question of justifying what they already believe and focus instead on when and how rational inquirers should change their minds.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Carnap, R.: 1952, Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Carnap, R.: 1962, Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
De Finetti, B.: 1974, Theory of Probability Vol. 1, New York: Wiley.
Jeffrey, R. C: 1965, The Logic of Decision, New York: McGraw Hill.
Jeffreys, H.: 1957, Scientific Inference, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jeffreys, H.: 1961, Theory of Probability, 3rd ed., London: Oxford University Press.
Keynes, J. M: 1921, A Treatise on Probability, London: Macmillan.
Kyburg, H. E.: 1961, Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
Levi, I.: 1967, Gambling with Truth, New York: Knopf.
Levi, I.: 1974, ‘On Indeterminate Probabilities’, Journal of Philosophy, 71, 391–418.
Levi, I.: 1980, The Enterprise of Knowledge, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Levi, I.: 1984, Decisions and Revisions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levi, I.: 1986, Hard Choices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levi, I.: 1989, ‘Possibility and Probability’, Erkenntnis, 31, 365–386.
Levi, I.: 1990a, ‘Compromising Bayesianism: A Plea for Indeterminacy’, Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 25, 347–362.
Levi, I.: 1990b, ‘Pareto Unanimity and Consensus’, The Journal of Philosophy, 87, 481–492.
Levi, I.: 1991, The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Savage, L. J.: 1954, The Foundations of Statistics, New York: Wiley.
Seidenfeld, T.: 1979, Philosophical Problems of Statistical Inference, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Seidenfeld, T., Kadane, J., and Schervish, M.: 1989, ‘On the Shared Preferences of Two Bayesian Decision Makers’, Journal of Philosophy, 86, 225–244.
Suppes, P.: 1965, ‘Probabilistic Inference and the Concept of Total Evidence’, in: J. Hintikka and P. Suppes (Eds.), Aspects of Inductive Logic, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Reference
Suppes, P. and Zanotti, M.: 1991, ‘Existence of Hidden Variables Having only Upper Probabilities’, Foundations of Physics, 21(12), 1479–1499.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Levi, I. (1994). Changing Probability Judgements. In: Humphreys, P. (eds) Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher. Synthese Library, vol 234. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0774-7_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0774-7_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4331-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-0774-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive