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Changing Probability Judgements

  • Isaac Levi
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 234)

Abstract

Charles Peirce insisted a long time ago that justifying beliefs currently held is unnecessary. Only changes in belief require justification. Epistemologists should turn away from the question of justifying what they already believe and focus instead on when and how rational inquirers should change their minds.

Keywords

Cognitive State Belief State Credal Probability Logical Truth Credal State 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Isaac Levi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyColumbia UniversityNew YorkUSA

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