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The Rational Choice Theory of Institutions: Implications for Design

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Institutional Design

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 43))

Abstract

Almost all accounts of policymaking organizations stress two important features. First, the process of policymaking, and the life of any organization, consists of a sequence of similar or related situations in which members of the organization must take actions. Second, the actions they take tend to fall into patterns: they behave in similar ways in similar situations, which is how we recognize a policy, an organization, or an institution in the first place

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Authors
  1. Randall L. Calvert
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© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Calvert, R.L. (1995). The Rational Choice Theory of Institutions: Implications for Design. In: Institutional Design. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4279-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-0641-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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