Fallibilism and the Pursuit of Truth

Abstract

Fallibilism is a philosophical doctrine most closely associated with the work of C. S. Peirce.¹ The doctrine is best understood in terms of a contrast with some related positions regarding the prospects of scientific knowledge of the world about us:

• all claims to theoretical scientific knowledge are inappropriate: We humans cannot achieve real knowledge in this domain, none of our claims to knowledge here can ever be satisfactorily substantiated. (SCEPTICISM);

• what we claim as theoretical scientific knowledge is always inaccurate and approximate — sufficient by and large for our practical purposes, but never accurate and strictly speaking correct. (APPROXIMATIONISM);

• our theoretical scientific knowledge claims are always vulnerable: they must always be staked tentatively because the prospect that further inquiry and discovery will lead to their modification or replacement can never be eliminated; the things we take ourselves to know many in the end have to be abandoned. (FALLIBILISM).