Criticism, Reasoning, and Judgment in Science

Abstract

In his autobiography, physicist Otto R. Frisch tells the following revealing anecdote about Niels Bohr. Bohr, we are told, “never trusted a purely formal or mathematical argument. ‘No, no’ he would say ‘You are not thinking; you are just being logical”’ (Frisch, 1979, p. 95).¹ It would be arbitrary and uncharitable to interpret Bohr’s point as implying that being logical is not a form of thinking. Rather it seems obvious that he is distinguishing between two types of thinking, logical thinking and another kind which may be appropriately labeled critical thinking. By logical thinking here Bohr seems to mean a mental activity which progresses from one thought to another in accordance with strict rules, namely rules that are clear, distinct, and exact. It might be better to call such thinking formal, or algorithmic, or deductive, in order not to limit the concept of logic to a one–sided and prejudicial conception. However, I do not want to focus on that, but rather on the other type of thinking. It is obvious from the context that critical thinking is different from logical thinking, not in the sense of being illogical, but rather in the sense that either it follows no rules or it follows rules that are not formal.² One may speak of informal judgment to refer to this feature of critical thinking being suggested here.