Approximative Truth and Depth as the Main Aims of Science

A discussion with John Watkins
  • Władysław Krajewski
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 160)


I fully agree with John Watkins that the aim of science must be feasible and must “involve the idea of truth”, that science “aspires after truth“. I also agree that the Bacon-Descartes ideal of science — the requirement of absolute truth and certainty — is no longer valid (Watkins, 1984, Ch. IV). What then to do with the idea of truth?


Special Relativity Classical Mechanic Exact Description Contemporary Science Chemical Phenomenon 
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  1. Krajewski, Władysław, Correspondence Principle and the Growth of Science (D. Reidel Dordrecht 1977).Google Scholar
  2. Popper, Karl, Objective Knowledge (Oxford University Press 1972).Google Scholar
  3. Watkins, John, Science and Scepticism (Princeton University Press 1984).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Władysław Krajewski
    • 1
  1. 1.Warszawa UniversityWarszawaPoland

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