On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach

  • Paul M. Churchland
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 160)


The notion of explanation has figured centrally in most contemporary accounts of scientific knowledge and rational belief. Explanation is usually cited, along with prediction, as one of the two principal functions of our factual beliefs. And the rationality of such beliefs is commonly said to be measured, at least in part, by the relative range or quality of the explanations they make possible. If something like this is correct, then it is important for us to try to understand what explanation is, and what distinguishes a good explanation from a poor one.


Synaptic Weight Hide Unit Folk Psychology Activation Vector Prototype Representation 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul M. Churchland
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLa JollaUSA

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