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In Defence of the Positivist View of Science

  • Marian Przełȩcki
Chapter
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Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 160)

Abstract

First — a few words about the title of these remarks. They are, in fact, meant not as a proper defence of the accused but as an attempt at understanding the motives of his crime. The accused is the positivist philosopher of science — a being quite rare at the present time (I sometimes wonder if I am not the last of the positivist Mohicans). What I mean by the ‘positivist’ view on science is also known as the ‘empiricist’ or simply as the ‘received’ (or’ standard’) view. The view occurs in various forms and versions. In spite of these differences, all the versions have something essential in common. And it is their common content that has become an object of of notorious criticism. There is no need to present the positivist tenets and their criticism on this occasion. Both are well known to anybody concerned with philosophical reflection on science.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marian Przełȩcki
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of WarszawaPoland

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