Abstract
Scientific realists have often been accused of hitching their wagon to some unsavoury metaphysical view or other. Many have thought that science freed of metaphysical encumbrances would not be realist science. Duhem thought so — and so, in our own times, do Bas van Fraassen and Arthur Fine.
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© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Musgrave, A. (1995). Realism and Idealisation. In: Misiek, J. (eds) The Problem of Rationality in Science and its Philosophy. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 160. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0461-6_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0461-6_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4206-2
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