Methods of Evading Detection by a Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Network under Special Conditions

Abstract

Progress in negotiations towards a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons depends to a considerable extent on the presence and effectiveness of techniques for the identification of underground nuclear explosions (UNE), techniques proposed by experts for verifying the monitoring of such agreements. It is generally considered [1, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13] that the seismic verification technique ensures, at present, a permissible level of reliability for detecting and identifying UNE with yields not less than 1 - 2 kt. This threshold could be considered as admissible from the standpoint of signing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is because testing a small-yield nuclear device does not allow one to create a real nuclear weapon. Nuclear charges with yields less than 1 kt cannot compete with chemical charges of the same total yield and same striking effect. However, the possibility of evading a seismic monitoring network by explosions with yields less than 1 kt should be considered.