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Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 65))

Abstract

Gottlob Frege begins his essay Sinn und Bedeutung by stating a puzzle (which we follow the tradition in calling ‘Frege’s Puzzle’) raised by the con- sideration of now familiar linguistic phenomena. Our main purpose in the present paper is to make plausible the claim that Frege’s puzzle remains a serious challenge that has not yet been dealt with in a fully satisfactory way.

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Corazza, E., Dokič, J. (1995). Why is Frege’s Puzzle Still Puzzling ?. In: Biro, J., Kotatko, P. (eds) Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 65. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0411-1_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0411-1_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4184-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-0411-1

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