Abstract
The restructuring of the American corporation through mergers has been the single most significant financial activity in the U.S. in the 1980s. The numbers and amounts of assets involved in mergers each year is almost overwhelming; almost no large firms approach the end of the decade without having merged at least once or sold a division acquired in an earlier period. This restructuring, partly due to pressures to become more efficient, and partly due to purely financial motivations, will have a lasting impact on the organization of industry in the United States.
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Smiley, R.H. (1995). Merger Activity and Antitrust Policy in the United States. In: Mussati, G. (eds) Mergers, Markets and Public Policy. Studies in Industrial Organization, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0387-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0387-9_3
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