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Before the Christianization of Pyrrhonism: Jansenism Faces Sceptical Fideism

  • José R. Maia Neto
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Part of the International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idées book series (ARCH, volume 144)

Abstract

The Christianization of Pyrrhonism results from the encounter of a Renaissance tradition of Sceptical Fideism with a revival of Augustinianism - epitomized in the Jansenist movement - during the seventeenth century. This section is about this context. I begin by indicating the basic theological views that opposed Jansenists and Jesuits, then I focus on the Jansenist perception of theological heresies implicated by their contemporaries’ interest in Greek-Roman philosophies.1

Keywords

Christian Faith Ethical Commitment Christian Religion Christian Doctrine Pure Nature 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • José R. Maia Neto
    • 1
  1. 1.Departamento de FilosofiaUniversidade Federal de Minas GeraisBelo HorizonteBrazil

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