Abstract
Suppose we set aside the Cartesian view that mind and matter are two essentially distinct substances. We need not deny that they appear to have contrary natures, mind as active unextended thinking, and matter as passive unthinking extension. As such, matter is said not to be capable of being modified by perceptions, either sensible or cognitive, and mind is said not to be capable of being modified by size, shape, position, and motion or rest. John Locke, examining this tradition, suggests that thinking and extension are merely the nominal essences of mind and matter, and that in fact we may not know their real essences.1 For all we know, mind could have a place and matter could think.2 The modes, ways of being, or properties we call ideas might as well be modifications of real matter as much as of real mind. Perhaps there are not even two substances but only one that manifests both thinking and extension, as Spinoza’s God expresses Himself through the attributes both of thinking and of extension.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [ 1690], collated and annotated, with prolegomena, biographical, critical, and historical, by Alexander Campbell Fraser, 2 volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891 ). Cited as follows as to book, chapter, and paragraph, plus volume number and page: IV VI 6, II 252; II XIII 22-23,I 409-410.
IV III 6, II 192.
II VIII 9, I 170.
II VIII 15,II 173
II VIII 15, II 173.
II VIII 13, II 172-173.
George Berkeley, Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision [1709], in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, volume 1, edited by A. A. Luce (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1948), pp. 141–279. Cited as to title and page (paragraph numbers are included in the quotations) asfollows:NT 188.
George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], in The Works of George Berkelely, Bishop ofCloyne, volume 2, edited by T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1949), pp. 1–113. Cited as to title and page (paragraph numbers included in the quotations) as follows: P 51-52.
P 104.
P 44.
George Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous [ 1713], in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, volume 2, edited by T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1949), pp. 147–263. Cited as to title, dialogue, and page as follows: TDI 206.
NT 228.
NT 228.
NT 228-229.
NT 229.
P 69.
P 69—70.
P 41.
P 61.
TD III 237.
P 78.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature [1739], edited, with an analytical index, by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888). Cited as to book, Part, Section, and Page as follows: I I I, 1.
II III III, 415.
II IV V, 233.
I IV V, 241.
I III IX, 108.
I IV V, 233.
I IV II, 207.
I II III, 219.
III III 7, II 17.
III III 7, II 18.
P 32.
P 32.
III III 9, II 18-19.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Watson, R.A. (1995). Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. In: Representational Ideas. Synthese Library, vol 250. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0075-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0075-5_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4037-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-0075-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive