Abstract
A number of writers, most of them long dead, have held that science proceeds by the “Inductive Method.” Very roughly, according to this method, we are to begin our investigations with the observation and collection of facts; then, by comparing those facts, and perhaps applying to them certain rules of reasoning, we are to arrive at scientific hypotheses, theories, and/or explanations. According to some versions of the Method, no further stages need be undergone, as the methods give proof of the conclusion; newer versions insist that proof is not given by inductive reasoning, that only probability is. Some newer versions also suppose a third stage, the testing of the hypothesis arrived at. Again, different variants disagree as to what that testing can do. According to some versions, it will produce evidence that will either verify or falsity (or confirm or disconfirm) the conclusion arrived at in Stage 2; for others, only falsification is possible. These differences, and indeed, all specific variants, will be irrelevant for the present discussion, except insofar as they are used as illustrative examples. Only the core version of the approach, according to which the first stage of scientific investigation is the collection of facts or data, will be relevant.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Mill, A System of Logic, New York: Harper, 1874, p. 280; Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1934, p. 251.
Cohen and Nagel, p. 253.
D. Shapere, “The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 49, #4 (Dec. 1982), pp. 485–525.
The single reference to Duhem in the original edition (1934) of Logik der Forschung describes him merely as holding “pronounced deductivist views.” (K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York: Basic Books, 1959, p. 30.)
K. Popper, “Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Knowledge,” in Conjectures and Refutations, New York: Basic Books, 1972, p. 239.
Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 238.
Popper, Objective Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon, 1972, p. 181.
Popper, Objective Knowledge, p. 33.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Shapere, D. (1995). On the Methods of Science. In: Leplin, J. (eds) The Creation of Ideas in Physics. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 55. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0037-3_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0037-3_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4021-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-0037-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive