Discussion: The Meno Paradox

Abstract

An argument of Michael Polanyi ([3], pp. 21–24) for the necessity of ‘tacit knowledge’, based upon the paradox of the Meno is refuted correctly by Michael Bradie [1] who observes that the paradox, in Polanyi’s version, rests on the false premise that “if you know what you are looking for, there is no problem”. Bradie’s refutation is based on an example, but he does not explain how the example works or why Polanyi’s premise is generally fallacious. It is the purpose of this note to describe some classes of conditions under which Polanyi’s premise will be false. I have given the argument less formally elsewhere ([4] and [5]), but will try to make it more precise here.

[Philosophy of Science 43, 147–151 (1976)].