Abstract
In this chapter I continue the analysis of the measurement of freedom, but I do so more specifically in the context of a person’s legal freedom. I examine the extent to which the results on the measurement of freedom of choice can be applied to the measurement of a person’s legal freedom. First, I shall discuss an important recent study on the measurement of freedom, a study by Ian Carter. Carter does not work within the choice-theoretic framework discussed so far, but works within the tradition of mainstream analytic political philosophy. His analysis, and the specific measure of freedom that he proposes, will be discussed in detail. Although it will be argued that the measure has its shortcomings, Carter’s broader informational framework has some clear advantages over the abstract framework of the opportunity set approach. Carter’s broader informational framework, however, also has its disadvantages, as it entails a limitation of applicability.
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© 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Van Hees, M. (2000). Conditions of Legal Freedom. In: Legal Reductionism and Freedom. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 47. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9453-5_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9453-5_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0285-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-9453-5
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