Abstract
The aim of this brief essay is to present some conjectures as to how Hume might have criticized certain central epistemological doctrines of Kant.1 By a natural extension of this theme I shall also raise a few questions concerning Karl Popper’s views on induction and his critique of the empiricist meaning criterion. I do this in the spirit of my very great admiration for Popper’s work and his friendship, which I cherish sincerely. If I have misunderstood his basic outlook, I hope that he will set me right in future discussions.
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© 1981 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Feigl, H. (1981). What Hume Might Have Said to Kant. In: Cohen, R.S. (eds) Inquiries and Provocations. Vienna Circle Collection, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9426-9_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9426-9_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1102-1
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