Intentionality and Possible-Worlds Semantics

Abstract

Our discussion of Husserl’s theory of intentionality has focused on two important notions and their role in the theory: the notions of meaning (or noema) and horizon. In Chapters III and IV our development of Husserl’s theory assumed — along with Husserl — a generally Fregean account of meaning. But in Chapter VI we studied a rather different analysis of meaning, the Carnapian analysis in terms of possible worlds. We found that this view, unlike the Fregean, allowed us to relate the theory of meaning to Husserl’s theory of horizon. Our effort in this chapter will be to develop Husserl’s theory of intentionality further by explicitly incorporating into the theory this possible-worlds analysis, or explication, of meaning and horizon. The result is an interesting extension of Husserl’s basic theory of intentionality featuring, in effect, the view that acts are directed toward objects occurring in possible worlds.