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Bound to the environment: Towards a phenomenology of sightlessness

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Dwelling, Place and Environment

Abstract

Human experience abounds in unifying conditions and forces which are disguised by an aura of obviousness and implicitness. This situation of normal unawareness is called by the phenomenologist the natural attitude — a pre-philosophic dimension of consciousness which conceals the world and prevents close scrutiny.1 The phenomenologist works to circumvent the natural attitude and to undertake a fresh, exhaustive examination of consciousness and experience. One result of this exercise is a clear sighting of the communion between body and world.

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Notes

  1. The natural attitude is a commonly discussed phenomenological theme; see Joseph J. Kockelmans, Phenomenology and Physical Science: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physical Science, Philosophical Series 21 (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1966), pp. 32–42; Amedeo Giorgi, Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenologically Based Approach (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 146–154; Marvin Farber, Phenomenology and Existence: Toward a Philosophy within Nature ( New York: Harper and Row, 1967 ), pp. 522–524.

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  2. See Herbert Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology through Vicarious Experience,” in Herbert Spiegelberg, Doing Phenomenology: Essays on and in Phenomenology ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975 ), pp. 46–53.

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  3. Ibid.

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  4. Jacques Luseyran, And There Was Light, Elizabeth R. Cameron, trans. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963); Jacques Lusseyran, The Blind in Society and Blindness: A New Seeing of the World, Proceedings no. 27 ( New York: The Myrin Institute, 1973 ).

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  5. Lusseyran, The Blind.

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  6. Ibid., p. 28.

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  7. Orientation involves establishing one’s position relative to objects in the environment; mobility is the ability to navigate from one position to another desired point. See Herbert D. Angus, Bob Howell, and Jacqueline Lynch, “Twenty Questions about Mobility,” The New Outlook for the Blind 63 (1969): 214–218; and Jesse Manley, “Orientation and Foot Travel for the Blind Child,” International Journal for the Education of the Blind 12 (1962): 8–13. As the blind person speaks of it, a “traveler” is one who possesses sufficient orientation and mobility skills coupled with confidence and motivation to enable himself or herself to find his or her own way around without the aid of another person.

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  8. Lusseyran, The Blind, p. 22.

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  9. Irene is one of the ten blind participants providing descriptive accounts. From youngest to oldest, their pseudonyms are William, Marianne, Jody, Susan, Laura, Neala, Renee, Sally, Irene, and Lincoln.

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  10. Lusseyran, The Blind, p. 22.

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  11. Ibid., p. 23, p. 22.

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  12. See Edward G. Ballard, “The Visual Perception of Distance,” in F.J. Smith, ed., Phenomenology in Perspective ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970 ), pp. 187–201.

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  13. Our language is grounded in the visual perspective. One watches television although the ears assist, and to see is to understand. Stuart Chase wrote, “No human is free to describe nature with strict objectivity, for he is a prisoner of his language.” See Stuart Chase, The Power of Words (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1954), p. 104. The visual perspective so prejudices the vocabulary and thought patterns of language that it can not concisely describe contrary elements.

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  14. For a phenomenological discussion of this aspect of hearing, see Don Ihde, “On Hearing Shapes, Surfaces and Interiors,” in Ronald Bruzina and Bruce Wilshire, eds., Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges: Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy 8 ( Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1982 ), pp. 241–251.

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  15. On a sidewalk, most blind people use one of the edges as a guide to follow rather than attempt to walk straight along the undistinguishable middle.

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  16. See Lusseyran, The Blind, pp. 28–29.

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  17. See Tom Sullivan and Derek Gill, If You Could See What I Hear (New York: Harper and Row, 1975 ).

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  18. Other terms used for object perception are “obstacle detection” and “facial perception.” See Ann Middleton Kidwell and Peter Swartz Greer, Sites, Perception, and the Nonvisual Experience: Designing and Manufacturing Mobility Maps (New York: American Foundation for the Blind, 1973).

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  19. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Coin Smith, trans. (New York: Humanities Press, 1962); Mary Rose Barral, Merleau-Ponty: The Role of Body-Subject in Interpersonal Relations (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965). The significance of this bodily ability and its role in everyday activities is explored in David Seamon, A Geography of the Lifeworld ( New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979 ).

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  20. See Seamon, Lifeworld, for more detailed accounts and examples.

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  21. David Seamon, personal correspondence, May 21,1980; also, see Seamon, Lifeworld, p. 115.

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  22. Sullivan and Gill, If You Could See, p. 10, p. 68.

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  23. Lusseyran, The Blind, p. 12.

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  24. Ibid.

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  25. See ibid., p. 18, p. 29.

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  26. Ibid., p. 29.

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  27. Ibid.

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  28. Sullivan and Gill, If You Could See, p. 181.

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  29. Lusseyran, The Blind, p. 31.

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  30. Ibid., p. 25, p. 26.

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  31. Lusseyran, And There Was Light, p. 28.

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  32. Lusseyran, The Blind, p. 31.

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  33. Ibid., p. 30. Lusseyran considers the senses successive stages of a single perception, touch.

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  34. Ibid.

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  35. See Ibid., p. 10, p. 14, p. 16, p. 17.

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  36. Ibid., p. 10.

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  37. Ibid., p. 26.

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  38. See Lusseyran, The Blind, p. 20.

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  39. See David Lowenthal, “Geography, Experience, and Imagination: Towards a Geographical Epistemology,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 51 (1961): 241–260.

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  40. Lusseyran, The Blind, p. 32, p. 25.

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  41. Ibid., p. 23, p. 15. This statement applies first to that which is said by a person, but also refers equally to objects.

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  42. Lusseyran uses these phrases. See The Blind, p. 19; and There Was Light, p. 16.

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  43. Ibid., p. 36.

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  44. See Lusseyran, The Blind, p. 18.

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  45. Ibid., p. 15.

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  46. Ibid., p. 18.

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  47. Ibid., p. 13.

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  48. Ibid., p. 28, p. 30.

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  49. Ibid., p. 20.

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David Seamon Robert Mugerauer

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© 1985 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

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Hill, M.H. (1985). Bound to the environment: Towards a phenomenology of sightlessness. In: Seamon, D., Mugerauer, R. (eds) Dwelling, Place and Environment. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9251-7_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9251-7_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-247-3282-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-9251-7

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