Introduction

Abstract

The topic of this study — theodicy — might appear at first glance somewhat exotic in the context of the current discussions of Descartes’ philosophy. Yet there is no term that better captures both Descartes’ intention and the overarching argument in the Meditations. Surprisingly enough, with the exception of Sergio Landucci’s study La Teodicea Nell’Età Cartesiana in which he discusses theodicies of several seventeenth-century thinkers, the Meditations have never been interpreted as theodicy. The reason for this, in my opinion, is the fact that Descartes’ prime concern is Certitude or Truth, while the classical theodicies deal with the existence of moral evil. Not once is the term moral evil (malum culpae) used in the Meditations; what comes closest is the word sin (peccatum). This is not an insurmountable obstacle to my thesis. According to Descartes, both error and sin result from the indifference of the will towards the true and the good. Although Descartes tried not to meddle with theological and moral issues, it is clear from his treatment of the good and the true — both of which, according to him, were established by God — that they are two aspects of the same problem. Thus insofar as theodicy is concerned with examining the relationship between the existence of evil on the one hand and God’s omnipotence and benevolence on the other, Descartes’ question “How would the goodness of God not preclude the possibility that nature is deceptive?” is in perfect conformity with, and continues the long tradition of, Christian apologetics.

Having so settled the rights of faith and of reason as rather to place reason at the service of faith than in opposition to it, we shall see how they exercise these rights to support and harmonize what the light of nature and the light of revelation teach us of God and man in relation to evil. Leibniz, Theodicy