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Events as Property Exemplifications

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 97))

Abstract

The term ‘event’ ordinarily implies a change, and most changes are changes in a substance. Whether coming into being and passing away can be construed as changes in substances is a question we shall not consider here. A change in a substance occurs when that substance acquires a property it did not previously have, or loses a property it previously had. Whether fissions and fusions of substances can be considered as cases of losing or acquiring properties is, again, a question we shall not discuss in this paper. By ‘substance’ I mean things like tables, chairs, atoms, living creatures, bits of stuff like water and bronze, and the like; there is no need here to associate this notion with a particular philosophical doctrine about substance.

I have benefited from discussions with, or unpublished materials furnished by, the following persons: David Benfield, Richard Cartwright, Roderick Chisholm, Donald Davidson, Fred Feldman, Michael A. Slote, Ernest Sosa, and Ed Wierenga.

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Notes

  1. E. g. by N. L. Wilson in ‘Facts, Events and Their Identity Conditions’; and by George Sher in ‘On Event-Identity’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1974), 39–47.

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  2. Davidson in his ‘Comments’ on Martin’s ‘On Events and Event-Descriptions’, Margolis (ed.), Fact and Existence, p. 81. Also Rosenberg in ‘On Kim’s Account of Events and Event-Identity’.

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  3. E. g. Carl G. Hedman claims this in his ‘On When There Must Be a Time-Difference Between Cause and Effect’, Philosophy of Science 39 (1972), 507–11.

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  4. On property identity, see Peter Achinstein, ‘The Identity of Properties’, American Philosophical Quarterly 11, 1974, 257–75.

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  5. I have in mind: Lawrence H. Davis, ‘Individuation of Actions’, Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970) 520–30; Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘The Time of a Killing’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 115–32; Alvin I. Goldman, ‘The Individuation of Action’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 761–74.

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  6. Such a view is suggested by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her ‘Individuating Actions’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 774–81.

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  7. Jerome Shaffer in ‘Persons and Their Bodies’, Philosophical Review 75 (1966), 59–77.

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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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Kim, J. (1976). Events as Property Exemplifications. In: Brand, M., Walton, D. (eds) Action Theory. Synthese Library, vol 97. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9074-2_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9074-2_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1188-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-9074-2

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