Particulars, Events, and Actions

Abstract

Philosophers of logic and language often make a distinction between three types of linguistic items:

• (i) singular terms, including names;

• (ii) predicates;

• (iii) sentences.

There is a corresponding distinction between three types of objects:

• (i′) particulars;

• (ii′) properties;

• (iii′) propositions.

Of course, this is a prima facie ontological division. Some persons have argued, for example, that there are no propositions, that propositions can be eliminated in favor of particulars having certain properties. Others have argued that there are no properties, that properties can be eliminated in favor of specifiable groupings of particulars. In any case, the tripartite division (i′)-(iii′) is a plausible working hypothesis, if not ultimately defensible.

I have received helpful comments on an earlier draft from Daniel Berger, F. Robert Bohl, Jr., Hector-Neri Castañeda, Alex Michalos, John Norman, Paul Teller, Irving Thalberg, and others. Work on this project has been partially supported by an NEH, 1974 Summer Stipend.