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Problems of Theoretical Physics in the Second Half of Nineteenth Century

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A History of the Ideas of Theoretical Physics

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 213))

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Abstract

Many traditional histories fail to point out that J.C. Maxwell (1831–1879) was innovative not only in his new field theory of electricity and magnetism, but also in his idea of a physical theory.1

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Notes

  1. Albert Einstein clearly recognised in various passages the revolutionary import of Maxwell’s theory (Einstein [1949] c) 33).

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  2. A clear understanding of Maxwell’s revolutionary view of the relationship between mathematics and physics can be grasped by a comparison between his and Thomson’s views as underlined by Smith and Wise. Thomson went out to slay the nihilist infidels of mathematical as opposed to physical ideas (Smith & Wise [1989] 445).

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  3. Maxwell [1855] 187.

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  4. Maxwell [1855] 208

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  5. Maxwell [1855] 208

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  9. Maxwell [1891] [1954].

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  11. Maxwell [1891] [1954] Part IV § 554, 199.

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  12. Maxwell [1891] [1954] Part IV, Chap. XXI, § 818.

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  13. D’Agostino [1968] b.

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  14. Maxwell [1891] [1954] Part IV,, Chap. V, § 554, 209. In his review paper, dealing extensively with Maxwell’s dynamical ideas, Norton Wise refers to G.G. Stokes’ distinction between “mechanical” and “dynamical” theories, the latter consisting in a methods that do not require the physicist “to assume either that the ether does or that it does not consist of distinct particles” (Wise [1992] 186).

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  15. Buchwald [1985], XII. As remarked by Buchwald, historians, physicists and philosophers used to interpret Maxwell’s method as a method mainly based on analogies, thus missing what was typical in Maxwell’s DA.

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  16. Maxwell [1891] [1954] Part IV, Chap. IV, § 552, 198.

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  17. Maxwell [189]) [1954] Part IV, Chap. V, § 567, 200.

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  18. Maxwell [1891] [1954] Part IV, Chap. IX, § 604, 247. According to Buchwald, the same ideas were shared by the Maxwellian, the physicists who pursued Maxwell’s approach (Buchwald [1985] 96 ff.).

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  19. Buchwald [198]) 27–33, 37–40, 47.

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  20. Maxwell [1954] a), Vol.2, 362.

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  22. Maxwell, “Atom”, in The Encyclopaedia Britannica, and in Maxwell [1954] a), 445–84.

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  24. Maxwell [1954] a) 471.

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  25. Maxwell [1954] a) Vol. 2, 215–229.

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  26. Maxwell [1954] a) Vol. 2, 223–224.

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  27. Maxwell [1954] a) Vol. 2, 471.

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  28. Maxwell, “On Stresses in Rarefied Gases arising from Inequalities in Temperature”, Maxwell [1954] a) Vol. 2, 681–712. Maxwell died in November of the same year.

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  29. Maxwell, Appendix to “On stresses in Rarefied Gases”, added in May 1879, cited in: Maxwell [1954] a) Vol. 2, 703–712, 704.

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  43. For Helmholtz the general form is that schema devoid of any content which he declared “to be the true form of intuition, in respect of which Kant’s doctrine of the’ a-priori is to be upheld”; (M. Schlick, notes to Hermann von Helmholtz Epistemologica Writings, in: Helmholtz [1977] 172, note 33).

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  57. Hertz [1956] 45.

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  64. The abolition of sources and of the classical concept of the force-source connection was certainly a paradigm shift of the utmost significance, as can be argued by the resistance it met among traditional physicists. As an example of this resistance, even at a later date, I like to quote Max Laue’s objection to Einstein’s equivalence principle in 1911, when have argues that a gravitational field produced by accelerating frames cannot be real since it has no masses as its sources; in: Einstein, “Dialog über Einvände gegen die Relativität Theorie”, Die Natürwis 6 [1918] 700. Quoted in: Norton [1985]. See also: D’Agostino [1993] a).

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  66. Hertz [1962] 159.

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  67. Hertz [1962] 3. On this point, see also: Helmholtz’s Preface to Hertz [1956] xi.

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  68. Hertz [1962] 197.

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  69. Hertz [1962] 197. Notice that Hertz uses correctness, not truth, concerning the probation value of an experimental confirmation of a theory.

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  70. Hertz [1962] 197. This conception of the theory-experiment relationship was to be named later as the Duhem-Quine hypothesis.

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  71. Hertz “On Electromagnetic Waves in Air and their Reflections”, in: Hertz [1962] 136

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  72. Hertz, “The forces of Electric Oscillations Treated According to Maxwell’s Theory”, in: Hertz [1962] 159. Poincaré argued that Hertz’s experiments were not crucial for Maxwell’s theory. The French scientist believed that a true theory should be crucially tested by an experiment. On this point: D’Agostino [1986].

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  73. Mach [1926] 2.

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  74. Helmholtz [1878] 170.

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  75. Mach, Analyse der Empfindungen, in: Schlick’s notes to Helmholtz (1878) 177.

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  76. Helmholtz [1878] 172.

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  77. Mach [1894]; Mach [1943] 241.

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  78. Mach [1943] 253.

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  79. Mach [1943] 253.

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  80. Mach [1943] 248.

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  81. Mach [1943] 248.

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  82. Mach [1943] 177.

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  83. Mach [1943] 253.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Università “La Sapienza”, Roma, Italy

    Salvo D’Agostino

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  1. Salvo D’Agostino
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© 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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D’Agostino, S. (2000). Problems of Theoretical Physics in the Second Half of Nineteenth Century. In: A History of the Ideas of Theoretical Physics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 213. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9034-6_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9034-6_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0244-1

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