Abstract
To what extent and in what respect is science intellectually valuable? This is a controversial matter. What is hardly disputed is that what is alterable in science is of mere ephemeral value; and what is valuable in it is that which is more universal and permanent, that which is more solid and lasting. One of the very few philosophers who oppose this accepted view is Sir Karl Popper. In his view, science is so valuable because of its open-mindedness, because any of its achievements may at any time be given up and newer achievements may be hoped for to replace the relinquished ones. Science, says Popper, is at constant war with itself, and it progresses by revolutions and internal conflicts.
I am indebted to my wife Judith, to William W. Bartley, III, and to Robert S. Cohen, for their patient reading of many drafts, and making many corrections and suggestions.
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References
See my Towards an Historiography of Science, The Hague 1963.
See my ‘The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics’, in The Critical Approach: Essays in Honor of Karl Popper (ed. M. Bunge), New York 1964.
K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York 1959.
I owe this to a private conversation with Burtt.
K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Chapter 10, ‘Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge’, § 5.
Alonzo Church, ‘Mathematics and Logic’, in Logic’, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress) (ed. E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski ), Stanford, Calif., 1962.
See Rudolf Carnap’s ‘Reply to Critics’, in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (ed. P. A. Schilpp), Evanston 1964.
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© 1967 D. Reidel Publishing Company / Dordrecht-Holland
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Agassi, J. (1967). Science in Flux. In: Cohen, R.S., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science 1964/1966. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3508-8_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3508-8_16
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