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Semantic Sources of the Concept of Law

  • Gerd Buchdahl
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 3)

Abstract

The concept of law, despite its long ancestry, has given philosophers considerable trouble. A sign of strain has been that not infrequently it has given rise to a variety of metaphysical positions. I think that these difficulties are in part due to an insufficient grasp of the complexity of the background against which the idea of law has been formed; that there is a very tangled network of approaches differing widely from one another, belonging to quite different fields of man’s preoccupation with nature, often criss-crossing, and even colliding. As might be expected in such a case, the resulting definitions and notions do not necessarily agree; indeed, there may between them exist a positive conflict. Philosophers, in their guise as metaphysicians, try to lessen the conflict but often only achieve this at the cost of producing an air of paradox about their solutions.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company / Dordrecht-Holland 1967

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerd Buchdahl
    • 1
  1. 1.Cambridge UniversityUK

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