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Elementarity and Reality in Particle Physics

  • William A. Wallace
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 3)

Abstract

Recent developments in high-energy physics have not been encouraging for anyone interested in the problem of elementarity. Not only has the number of so-called elementary particles increased rapidly during the past few years — from less than a half dozen to thirty, then to over a hundred — but also the propriety of referring to these as ‘elementary’ has been increasingly questioned.1 Part of the latter concern arises from the great number of particles, for it would seem that the elements of which things are constituted should be few in number. A more puzzling paradox arises from the fact that many of the particles being discussed by physicists, particularly those referred to as strongly interacting particles, seem in some sense to be composites of one another.2

Keywords

Type Species Junior Synonym Original Designation Peripheral Skeleton Choanocyte Chamber 
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References

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company / Dordrecht-Holland 1967

Authors and Affiliations

  • William A. Wallace
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Catholic University of AmericaUSA
  2. 2.St. Stephen’s PrioryUSA

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