Abstract
A given logical system is formally elaborated in strictly symbolic form, we shall say. While certain practical interests might have prompted such a presentation in the quite general language of variables, and while those same interests could have suggested the detailing of the system into some combinations of symbols rather than others, the structure of the system itself does not contain any register of those interests. They are not included in a census of the system. At best, they stand in some anteroom to the logic, petitioning that its exactness be used to clarify some relatively opaque sector of experience. Such petitions concern an application of the logic, but not its internal systemic nature.
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References
Ralp M. Eaton, Symbolism and Truth (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1925, re-issued by Dover Publications, New York, 1964 ), p. 54.
Morris Cohen’s very cogent descriptions of polar concepts have been in the background of our discussions frequently, but here explicit reference to his descriptions has guided the elaboration of a point. See his A Preface To Logic (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd, London, 1946 ), 75–76.
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© 1967 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Helm, B.P. (1967). On Letting. In: Philosophical Logic. Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3497-5_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3497-5_6
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