Abstract
Francis Bacon struck a note which still reverberates: that knowledge is power. He saw a relationship between our knowledge of the external world, and our ability to submit the laws of its action to our own ends; the realization of the relationship was to lead, in effect, to a revision of those laws. But in Bacon’s opinion, one of the obstacles which impedes our progress is that “the human mind is of its own nature prone to suppose the existence of more order and regularity in the world than it finds.” 1 We must rather abandon the “pernicious and inveterate habit of dwelling on abstractions,” 2 and fix our attention instead upon the evidence of the senses.
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References
The conception of logical implication seems to have developed from the idea of natural causality in antiquity. The precise definition of the relation of cause and effect to antecedent and consequent remains elusive, but the analogy continues to be a useful one. For the early history of these ideas, see G. E. R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy, Cambridge University Press, 1966, pp. 422ff.
C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Open Court Publishing Company, 1946, Ch. I.
C. I. Lewis, “Alternative Systems of Logic,” The Monist, XLII (October 1932) pp. 481–507.
C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order, New York, Dover, 1956, p. 233.
W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1962, Vol. I, p. 446 remarks that one finds not completely original ideas, but rather the analysis by powerful minds of “modes of thought typical of the age.”
Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, Cybernetics and Society, Doubleday, 1954.
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© 1967 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Dubose, S. (1967). Observations on the Uses of Order. In: Philosophical Logic. Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3497-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3497-5_3
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