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Probability Logic and its Role in Scientific Research

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Problems of the Logic of Scientific Knowledge

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 25))

Abstract

Probability logic is generally understood today as a logic which assigns to propositions not just two truth-values but a whole series of such values, variously called probabilities of truth, degrees of confirmation, degrees of likelihood, etc. [1]. As distinguished from classical mathematical logic which operates with two truth-values, probability logic has to do with a range of such values, which is, in principle, unlimited. It is for this reason a branch of many-valued logic. However, while the other systems of many-valued logic have to do with a set of discrete truth-values, probability logic deals with a continuous scale of values.

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Bibliography

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References

  1. Such an approach to probability was foreshadowed in Leibniz’ dissertation (printed in his 23rd year), ‘On Means of Choosing a King in Poland’. Cf. [5; V].

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  2. Dice, the center of gravity of which does not coincide with the center of gravity of

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  3. a cube (e.g., loaded dice).

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  4. This final specification is obvious since from a false proposition follows any proposition, true or false.

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  5. Keynes, Nagel, and others have doubts about the possibility of an exact quantitative expression of probability 1 (degree of confirmation of a hypothesis). This is why their works deal with numerical evaluation only in a few cases. They concentrate on the comparative concept of confirmation.

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  6. The reader can learn more about L-concepts from Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity [15; 36–48].

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  7. The range of a proposition is the class of all those state-descriptions in which the given proposition holds.

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  8. The subject of the application of probability logic to inferences by analogy is taken up in Uemov’s article in the present book.

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  9. Cf. ibid.

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Authors
  1. G. I. Ruzavin
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Editor information

P. V. Tavanec

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© 1970 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Ruzavin, G.I. (1970). Probability Logic and its Role in Scientific Research. In: Tavanec, P.V. (eds) Problems of the Logic of Scientific Knowledge. Synthese Library, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3393-0_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3393-0_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-3395-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-3393-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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