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Induction, Acceptance and Rational Belief pp 186–227Cite as

Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief: A Selected Bibliography

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 26))

Abstract

This bibliography is constructed, in the main, of books and articles published in the last 20 years, which pertain to or are related to the topic of the book. The bibliography has four sections: (I) Books and Anthologies, (II) Selected Reviews of those books, (III. A) Articles pertaining to the topic of the book and (III.B) Articles on related topics. No section contains an exhaustive compilation of materials, although an attempt was made not to omit any major contribution in the first three sections. Section III.B deals chiefly, but not exclusively, with articles on paradoxes of confirmation, including Goodman’s new riddle of induction and Miller’s paradox of information; the problems of confirmation theory and attempts to define measures of degrees of confirmation; simplicity; explanation; the logic of knowledge and belief; and analyses of empirical knowledge. For bibliographies of earlier material, see Keynes [50], Carnap [16], and von Wright [118]; for more recent literature see Kyburg [55] and [571] and Hilpinen [356].

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I. Books and Anthologies

I. Books and Anthologies

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    Ralph L. Slaght

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Slaght, R.L. (1970). Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief: A Selected Bibliography. In: Swain, M. (eds) Induction, Acceptance and Rational Belief. Synthese Library, vol 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3390-9_9

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