Abstract
The central point of positivism — taking “positivism” in the wider sense of empirical philosophy at large — is the emphasis on the given in the interpretation of knowledge. All knowledge, according to empirical-positivistic philosophy in general, is based on the sense-given as the real source of knowledge. Positivism thus tends to be a philosophy of the given — one that seeks to base all systems of knowledge, free from presuppositions, on the positive, i.e., on what is actually and originally given in consciousness. In this sense, Husserl claims, phenomenology would amount to positivism; referring to the common point in view, he remarks: “…then we are genuine positivists”.2
Adapted from the author’s article: “Phenomenology and Positivism”, pub. in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, June 1963.
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© 1969 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Sinha, D. (1969). Phenomenology and the Empiricist Tradition. In: Studies in Phenomenology. Phaenomenologica, vol 30. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3369-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3369-5_2
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