Abstract
We might distinguish between inductive and deductive inferences in the following way: Deductive inferences refer to the implications of coherence for a given set of beliefs, whereas inductive inferences follow from conditions for ‘rational’ change in belief. Change in belief, I shall argue in the following section, is perhaps the most philosophically relevant notion of semantic information. Thus rules governing inductive inferences may be regarded as rules for the acquisition of semantic information.
Professors Ronald Howard and Howard Smokier have made valuable comments concerning aspects of this work and the author had a long and very helpful conversation with Professor L. J. Savage concerning related topics. The author is particularly indebted to Professor Patrick Suppes, the influence of whose writings will be evident throughout, and whose advice and comments have been of great value. This paper is based in part on the author’s previous work - Jamison [19, 20] - and was completed by the author in his capacity as consultant to the RAND Corporation.
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Jamison, D. (1970). Bayesian Information Usage. In: Hintikka, J., Suppes, P. (eds) Information and Inference. Synthese Library, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3296-4_2
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